About $52 million a year. Most of that, $40 million, funds the independent anti-corruption body. That’s equivalent to the annual funding for the New South Wales anti-corruption commission, adjusted for population size and converted to NZD. That is likely an upper limit: the Serious Fraud Office, with similar functions, is funded at approximately $17 million a year. The rest is $10 million in additional funding for the Electoral Commission and $2 million for an independent policy costing unit active in election years. Maintaining the lobbying register will impose modest costs that we consider could be met from existing justice budgets.

That reputation is worth protecting, and the rules underpinning it are dangerously thin. We have no cap on political donations, no register of lobbyists and no standing anti-corruption body. A recent Serious Fraud Office assessment concluded that the risk of corruption is increasing, incidents are under-reported and agencies are insufficiently prepared to prevent and respond to corrupt practices. Overseas, opportunistic leaders have shown how quickly a high-trust system can be hollowed out once the guardrails fail. Strong integrity rules are also an economic asset: countries with credible anti-corruption institutions tend to enjoy more stable investment climates and lower long-run losses from fraud and maladministration. We would rather strengthen the rules now than wait for a scandal to force the issue.

No. These are long-term, constitutional-type reforms that should outlast any one government, so Opportunity will work across Parliament to build support that will not be reversed at the next change of government. There is more common ground than you might think: New Zealand First has the creation of an anti-corruption commission as a founding objective in its constitution, the Greens and Te Pāti Māori have previously indicated agreement in principle, and both major parties have attempted to regulate lobbying while in government.

No. Everyone keeps the right to raise an issue with their local MP; that is not lobbying. The rules target professional lobbying: people paid by clients to influence decision-makers, or people who spend a substantial part of their time lobbying. Ordinary requests for information, participation in tenders, and public comment or submissions made as part of legislative or other processes are all excluded.

The cooling-off period is about ensuring inside knowledge and relationships cannot confer an undue advantage once a Minister or senior official departs, and that the promise of a future role does not unduly influence their decision-making while in office. But it applies to a broad range of roles, from third-party lobbying at specialist firms to government relations roles at corporates and advocacy roles at NGOs and peak bodies, and people are entitled to make a living from their expertise. A longer period would put them at a significant financial and professional disadvantage. "Senior officials" means senior Beehive staff such as the Prime Minister's chief of staff and ministerial advisors, and the chief executives who head public sector organisations.

Everyone remains free to support the parties and campaigns they believe in. The cap of $30,000 per donor per three-year electoral cycle is the figure recommended by the Independent Electoral Review: high enough to let committed supporters contribute meaningfully, low enough that no single donor can buy disproportionate influence.

Because votes belong to people, not entities. Allowing only enrolled voters to donate keeps political funding connected to the people who actually cast ballots. It also closes the most common routes for disguising the true source of money, including foreign money funnelled through a New Zealand company or trust. Businesses, unions and other organisations remain free to take part in public debate; they simply cannot bankroll parties.

Disclosure at $1,000 strikes a deliberate balance. Genuinely small contributions stay private; anything else goes on the public record. Voters are entitled to know who is funding the parties asking for their vote.

The opposite. A system that relies less on big cheques and more on small, transparent contributions levels the playing field. Firm spending limits across the whole cycle reduce the advantage held by parties with wealthy networks or established donor bases, which makes it easier, not harder, for new and smaller parties to compete.

Applying spending limits across the whole three-year cycle, not just the final three months, is what stops the rules being gamed by front-loading. Combined with the third-party rules and quarterly spending summaries from the Electoral Commission, it keeps the contest about ideas rather than chequebooks.

The current system of broadcasting funding allocation needs reform, and we would support a process to do that. If reduced donation levels as a result of our changes make it hard for political messages to be communicated, we would consider increasing the broadcasting allocation across the board.

We do, and the anti-corruption body would work alongside them, not replace them. The gap in the current system is "soft" corruption — conduct like conflicts of interest, nepotism and misuse of information — which often falls between the cracks of existing agencies. The new body would have a clear, standing mandate to investigate, expose and prevent that conduct, and would refer serious criminal matters to the SFO or Police.

That criticism, levelled at some Australian commissions, is exactly why design matters. Our design would carry strong due-process safeguards: legal representation, the right to file evidence and submissions, and the usual privileges of witnesses.

No. The requirement is deliberately modest, and modelled on similar provisions in South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, where courts have maintained the narrow scope and concluded it does not unduly impede free speech. It does not impose any monetary penalties; the remedy is a published correction, so voters get accurate information.

The OIA is not functioning properly at its core role of enabling transparency and public access to information. Ministers and departments are too easily able to justify withholding information that should be public, and statutory timeframes are routinely breached with little consequence. Opportunity would narrow the grounds for withholding, add a clear public-interest balancing test, make the statutory timeframes mean what they say — the actual provision of documents, not a holding response — and give the Ombudsman binding order-making powers. Striking the detailed balance between transparency and legitimate confidentiality is a job for a thorough law reform process and robust select committee scrutiny.

Broader coverage across the public and private sectors, safe and direct channels to the anti- corruption body and other enforcement agencies, and stronger protection against retaliation, including interim relief.